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Moral Dilemmas 
Shyam Nair 
 
B-Entry (304 words) 
 A moral dilemma is a situation where an agent’s obligations conflict. Debate in this area 
focuses on the question of whether genuine moral dilemmas exist. This question involves 
considering not only the nature and significance of dilemmas, but also the connections between 
dilemmas, the logic of obligation, and moral emotions. 
 Certain cases involving difficult choices suggest that moral dilemmas exist. These cases 
also suggest that dilemmas are significant because they show that moral theory cannot help with 
these choices. If this is right, morality may be unimportant because it may be a system of 
inconsistent rules that cannot be used as a guide that tells us what to do. But this understanding 
of the cases is disputable. Perhaps the cases show that agents can be ignorant about what they 
ought to do. Or perhaps dilemmas are not significant because moral theory tells agents to do the 
most important of their obligations. 
 On the other hand, principles from the logic of obligation or deontic logic can be used to 
argue against the existence of moral dilemmas. Principles of deontic logic such as the ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’ principle and the agglomeration principle, which says if you ought to do a and 
ought to do b, then you ought to do a and b, taken together with the assumption that moral 
dilemmas exist, turn out to entail a contradiction. This means that one of these principles must be 
given up, or else it must be the case that moral dilemmas do not exist 
 Careful consideration of the moral emotions has suggested that dilemmas do exist. It is 
appropriate for agents to feel guilt only if they ought to have done otherwise. In cases involving 
difficult choices, it is appropriate to feel guilt no matter what course of action is taken. This 
suggests that such cases involve genuine dilemmas. 
1. The Nature and Significance of Moral Dilemmas (956 words) 
A moral dilemma is a situation where an agent ought to do some act, a, and ought to do 
another act, b, but cannot do both a and b. Philosophical reflection about moral dilemmas 
typically begins by considering cases like the following case originally due to Jean-Paul Sartre 
(1946). A young man has to decide whether to stay at home to take care of his ailing mother or to 
leave home to fight with the resistance who are opposing an unjust regime. In this case, it is 
natural to think that he ought to fight with the resistance because it supports a just and righteous 
cause. And it is also natural to think that he ought to stay home and care for his beloved and 
ailing mother.  
 Taken at face value, this case supports the existence of moral dilemmas or situations in 
which an agent ought to do a and ought to do b but cannot do both a and b. And taken at face 
value, it seems that the predicament the agent in Sartre’s case is in is philosophically significant 
because he faces an important choice and moral theory cannot tell him which option to chose. 
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But there are certain strategies that suggest that we may not have to take things at face value and 
so may not have to admit that these cases involve philosophically significant moral dilemmas. 
The first strategy is to deny that the cases support the existence of moral dilemmas. To 
see why this might be plausible, notice that we do not know some relevant features of this case. 
In particular, we do not know which of the acts is most important: we do not know whether it is 
more important for the young man to stay at home or fight with the resistance. The idea, then, is 
that we are not actually under conflicting obligations in this case. Instead, we ought to do the 
most important of the acts and simply don’t know which act is the most important. 
 This strategy relies on the idea that one of the acts is more important than the other. A 
difficulty of this approach is that there are two kinds of cases in which there is no act that is the 
most important. The first kind of case involves acts whose importances are incommensurable 
(Nagel 1979). In Sartre’s case for example, we might think that the acts are of incommensurable 
importance in the sense that they are so different that we cannot sensibly rank one as more 
important than the other. The second kind of case involves acts that are equally important. To 
adapt an example from Ruth Barcan Marcus (1980), consider an agent who has made two 
equally important promises but cannot keep both. Since no act is most important in these cases, 
we cannot explain away the appearance of moral dilemma in the way suggested by the first 
strategy. So these kinds of cases support the existence of moral dilemmas (Sinnott-Armstrong 
1988). 
 This does not however show that there is anything philosophically significant about the 
existence of moral dilemmas. The reason why it doesn’t establish this is that there is an 
important distinction between prima facie obligations and all things considered obligations 
(Ross 1930). If we are prima facie obligated to do something, this means that there is something 
to be said in favour of doing it. For instance, we are prima facie obligated to help those in need 
and keep our promises. Evidently, these obligations can conflict. For example, suppose a woman 
has promised to meet her friend for lunch at noon, but on her way to lunch she sees someone 
who is drowning in a lake. Suppose that if she saves the drowning person, she will not be able to 
make it to lunch. In cases like this, she is under conflicting prima facie obligations. 
 But these kinds of conflicting obligations are not philosophically significant because they 
do not show that an agent faces an important choice that moral theory cannot help with. Instead, 
a good moral agent in this case would break the promise and help the stranger. This is because if 
we take into account all of the morally relevant facts, the thing that this agent ought to do overall 
is save the drowning person. There are conflicting prima facie obligations, but this does not 
show that there are conflicting all things considered obligations. 
 Applying this idea to Sartre’s case, we can allow that it involves conflicting obligations 
while denying that it is a philosophically significant moral dilemma by saying that the case 
involves conflicting prima facie obligations. Of course, we do still face the question of what the 
agent ought to do all things considered in this case. And since cases like Sartre’s and Marcus’s 
involve incommensurable or equally important considerations, we will not be able to say, as in 
the case involving meeting a friend for lunch or saving someone who is drowning, that the agent 
ought to do one of these acts in particular all things considered. 
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Instead, it seems we should say that what the agent ought to do all things considered is 
disjunctive: all things considered the agent ought to fight for the resistance or stay at home 
(Donagan 1984). Since recognizing a disjunctive obligation does not commit us to thinking that 
there can be a situation in which an agent ought to do a and ought to do b but cannot do both, 
this disjunctive strategy gives us a way of explaining Sartre’s case without accepting that there 
are moral dilemmas. Thus, recognizing a disjunctive obligation to either fight or serve gives us 
an alternative analysis of Sartre’s case according to which it does not involve a moral dilemma. 
2. Arguments Against Moral Dilemmas from Deontic Logic (885 words) 
 The second issue surrounding moral dilemmas concerns their logic. In particular, there 
are plausible principles of deontic logic, the logic of obligation, that entail that a contradiction or 
some other undesirable result follows from the existence of conflicting obligations. While there 
are many such arguments, here we will consider only two. These two arguments rely on three 
principles concerning the logic of ‘ought’. 
The first principle says that if it ought to be that a and b follows from a, then it ought to 
be that b. Some evidence for this principle is that we reason well when we reason in accordance 
with it: Suppose that a law has been passed that requires all citizens to register to vote. And 
suppose this makes it the case that it ought to be that all citizens vote. It seems that reasoning 
from this claim to the claim that it ought to be that some citizens vote is good reasoning. 
 The second principle says that if it ought to be that a and it ought to be that b, then it 
ought to be that a and b. Some evidence for this agglomeration principle is that we reason well 
when we reasoning in accordance with both it and the first principle. Suppose that Smith ought 
to fight in the army or perform alternative public service (because, e.g., the law says so). And 
suppose that Smith ought to not to fight (because, e.g., his religion is pacifistic). It seems that 
reasoning from these two claims to the claim that Smith ought to perform alternative public 
service is good reasoning. This case illustrated why it is desirable to have the second principle by 
providing an argument for adopting the package of both first and second principles (Van 
Fraassen 1973, Horty 2003, Goble 2009). Using the first principle alone we cannot derive ‘Smith 
ought to serve’ from ‘Smith ought to fight or serve’ and ‘Smith ought not to fight’. However, the 
agglomeration principle tells us that ‘Smith ought to fight or serve and not fight’ validly follows 
from the premises ‘Smith ought to fight or serve’ and ‘Smith ought not to fight’. Applying the 
first principle to this result allows us to derive the desired conclusion, ‘Smith ought to serve’. 
 The third and final principle is the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle. It says that if you 
ought to do a, then you can do a. While there are a variety of motivations for this principle, one 
motivation for it comes from our practices of giving advice. To illustrate, suppose we were to 
advise Joan about what she ought to do. If we were to tell her to do something that she cannot do 
such as draw a square circle, she would rightly feel that we have given her bad advice. The 
‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle explains why this advice is bad: it is bad advice because it is 
certain to be false. 
 With these three principles in hand, we can now consider two problems about moral 
dilemmas. The first problem involves the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and agglomeration principles. 
The argument begins by supposing that there are conflicting obligations. That is, it begins by 
supposing that it ought to be that a, it ought to be that b, and it cannot be that a and b. Using the 
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agglomeration principle, we can derive that it ought to be that a and b. And then using the 
‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle we can derive that it can be that a and b. This contradicts our 
starting assumption that it cannot be that a and b. So this problem shows that if we accept the 
agglomeration principle, the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle, and conflicting obligations, we are 
committed to a contradiction (see Lemmon 1962). 
 In order to accept moral dilemmas while not having to accept a contradiction, we must 
reject either the agglomeration principle or the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle. However, 
rejecting the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle alone will not be enough to solve a second problem 
involving conflicting obligations. This second problem only relies on the agglomeration principle 
and the first principle (if it ought to be that a and a entails b, then it ought to be that b). Suppose 
that it ought to be that a, it ought to be that b, and it cannot be that a and b. By agglomeration, 
we can conclude it ought to be that a and b. Since it is impossible for a and b to be true and since 
a contradiction entails everything, the first principle tells us that it ought to be that c for any c at 
all. This shows that if we accept conflicting obligations, the first principle, and the agglomeration 
principle, we have to accept that there is an explosion of obligations (see Goble 2009). While this 
may not be as bad as a contradiction, it is nonetheless unacceptable.  
 In recent years, increasingly sophisticated logics of conflicting obligations have been 
developed in response to these problems. These logics try to do two things. First they try to avoid 
the sanctioning contradictions and other undesirable results (see Chellas 1976). And second they 
try to provide alternative explanations of the cases that we used to support the principles of 
deontic logic that we relied on (see Horty 2003, Goble 2009). 
3. Arguments for the Existence of Moral Dilemmas from the Moral Emotions (717 words) 
 While issues in logic put pressure on us to reject moral dilemmas, considering moral 
emotions put pressure on us to accept moral dilemmas. This was perhaps first noticed by Bernard 
Williams (1965). We can illustrate Williams’s idea by returning to Sartre’s example of the young 
man who must choose between fighting with the resistance or staying at home to help his 
mother. It is natural to think that it is appropriate for him to feel guilty for not staying at home if 
he chooses to fight with the resistance and similarly, that it is appropriate for him to feel guilty 
for not fighting for the resistance if he chooses to stay at home. As Williams put it, in cases like 
Sartre’s there is a moral residue no matter what the agent chooses to do. 
 To see why this puts pressure on us to accept moral dilemmas, we need to know 
something about the nature of the moral emotion, guilt. Plausibly, it is appropriate for agents to 
feel guilt for failing to do some act only if they ought to have done that act (or, perhaps, only if 
they know or believe they ought to have done that act). To see why this is plausible, return to the 
case where an agent has promised to meet her friend for lunch but ends up breaking the promise 
because she is saving someone who is drowning. In this case, it seems inappropriate for this 
agent to feel guilt, because it is not true that that she ought (all things considered) to have kept 
her promise, and she does not believe that in this case she ought to have kept her promise. 
 If this is the right thing to say about the nature of guilt, then the fact that the agent will 
feel guilt no matter what he does in Sartre’s case provides some evidence for the claim that this 
agent is in a philosophically significant moral dilemma. After all, it only makes sense for him to 
feel guilty for failing to fight for the resistance if he ought to have fought for the resistance and 
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similarly it only make sense for him to feel guilty for failing to stay home if he ought to have 
stayed home. Thus, it seems that the only way the moral emotions an agent feels in this case 
make sense is if he is in a philosophically significant moral dilemma. 
 One response to this argument begins by conceding that there is some sort of moral 
residue left over if the agent chooses to fight for the resistance, there is some sort of negative 
attitude or feeling that it is appropriate for the agent to have toward his failure to stay at home. 
Having conceded this, the response continues by noting that this residue provides evidence for 
the existence of moral dilemmas only if the negative attitude that is appropriate is the attitude of 
guilt. And in order to know that this attitude is guilt rather than some other negative attitude, we 
would have to know that this attitude is one that is appropriate only if the agent ought to have 
stayed home. But the claim that the agent ought to have stayed home (or the claim that he 
believes or knows this) can hardly be used in a non-question-begging argument for the existence 
of moral dilemmas. After all, admitting this is tantamount to simply accepting that there are 
moral dilemmas. Thus, this reply suggests that the argument from moral emotions can only 
establish that there are moral dilemmas if it assumes from the start that there are moral dilemmas 
(McConnell 1978). 
 This reply assumes that the only way to distinguish between guilt and other negative 
attitudes toward an agent’s own past actions is by judging that the agent ought to have done 
otherwise. This assumption is plausible if we accept views according to which the only 
difference between feeling guilty and have some other negative attitude is that guilt requires it to 
be the case that the agent ought to have done otherwise. But if we are not convinced that such 
views are correct, this response will not be decisive. We may be able to distinguish between guilt 
and other negative attitudes without appealing to the claim that the agent ought to have done 
otherwise.  
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